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 Chapter 16 
 Technologies, Incentives and Cost Recovery: 
Is There an Israeli Role Model? 
 Christine  Bismuth ,  Bernd  Hansjürgens , and  Ira  Yaari 
 Abstract  This chapter focuses on water policy reforms and the introduction of a 
new water pricing policy in Israel. These reforms have to be seen in combination 
with measures to extend the available water sources that have been introduced in 
Israel in recent years. The effects of the Israeli demand and supply management 
policy on the use and availability of the water resources is investigated, and the 
potential transferability of the Israeli experiences to other countries in the region is 
examined. We also discuss the contribution of the water policy reforms as part of 
possible options and alternatives to the planned RSDS Conveyance Project. 
 Keywords  Water policy •  Water management institutions •  Water pricing •  Water 
use •  Desalination •  Wastewater treatment •  Water consumption •  Agriculture • 
 Levies •  Israel national water system 
16.1  Introduction 
 Israel’s water policies in recent years have presented its end users with two dia-
metrically opposite modus operandi: from one point of view, Israel can be seen as a 
pioneer in agricultural water-saving technologies and water desalination projects 
(OECD  2011 ), and from the other view, Israel is wasting water, using the majority 
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of the Jordan River’s water resources and overexploiting the aquifers which are 
shared with the Palestinians (Amnesty International  2009 ). 
 In the 1990s and in the ﬁ rst decade of the third millennium, Israel was confronted 
with the impacts of a series of drought years. Several reports revealed that with 
respect to water, to continue with a “business as usual” policy was not possible. 
Israel reacted with the introduction of technical innovations in the water sector and 
a reform of water management institutions and pricing policies. 
 Some of these measures could be looked upon as being the adaptation of existing 
major water engineering projects (MWEPs), such as the Israel Water Carrier, or 
even being a second-generation MWEP. 
 Does the reform mean a shift away from the traditional technology-centred 
approach (MWEP logic)? And how have the reforms inﬂ uenced the discussion 
around the Red Sea–Dead Sea Conveyance Project and its possible options? 
16.2  The Evolution of Israel’s Water and Agrarian Policy 
 From the ﬁ rst Zionist settlements, water in conjunction with land had been the driv-
ing force for the development of Israel’s society and economy. Working the land 
was strongly linked to the Zionist ideology (Lipchin  2007 ). Modern agricultural 
techniques were introduced in Palestine not only by the Jewish settlers but also by 
Christian religious settlements from America and German Pietism movements 
(Kark  1983 ). A major inﬂ uence stemmed not only from the introduction of modern 
agricultural techniques but also from the commercial marketing methods introduced 
by Baron de Rothschild who transferred all his properties and interests from his 
Palestinian settlements ( moshavim ) to the Jewish Colonization Association. Right 
from the beginning of Jewish expansion in the late nineteenth century, there was a 
difference between the subsistence system of the local Arab communities and the 
European model, based on cash crop plantations and shaping the Jewish settlements 
(Aaronsohn  1995 ). Jewish settlers did not come from traditional agrarian societies, 
but had a more urban background. From the commencement, the settlers invested 
not only in modern technologies and fertilisers, but they also improved the water 
supply devices within the settlements ( ibid. ). The strong ties and close communica-
tion between agricultural research and the farmer communities, most of whom had 
an excellent education, though not necessarily in agriculture, and the strong ties of 
the research communities with the Kibbutzim were determining factors for the high 
innovation rate within the Israeli agriculture. When compared to other agricultural 
societies, their pace of practical implementation in agricultural innovation has been 
considerably slower (Katz and Ben-David  1975 ). 
 Israel’s Water Law of 1959 declared water as a public good, and its management 
was given into the responsibility of state institutions (Lipchin  2007 ). Any abstraction 
of water and any use of water require a permit. The requirement to monitor and mea-
sure the water was already included in the 1955 Water Measurement Law (Feitelson 
 2013 ). Since then, the water management system of Israel has been highly central-
ised. Its main purpose was subordinated to agricultural uses (Feitelson et al.  2007 ). 
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The water law also foresaw the institution of a “Water Commissioner” whose task 
was to monitor and allocate water rights. The Water Commission itself was supposed 
to be composed of two thirds of the general public, but the commission was domi-
nated by representatives from the agricultural sector receiving 13 out of the 39 repre-
sentative positions allocated (Plaut  2000 ). Until 2000, the Minister of Agriculture 
was the supreme statutory authority for the formulation of Israel’s water policy. Also 
the Knesset Finance Committee, which was supposed to supervise the water policies, 
was dominated by agricultural lobbying groups ( ibid. ). As a result of these policies, 
water prices in the agricultural sector did not reﬂ ect the scarcity of the resource. 
 Instead, the agricultural sector was highly subsidised, and crops with a high 
water consumption rate such as cotton, citrus and ﬂ owers became proﬁ table. Not 
only are these crops not adapted to the arid climatic conditions, but also they require 
high quantitative and quality water (Lipchin  2007 ). 
 In his 1990 report, Israel’s state comptroller heavily criticised the existing water 
policies. In addition, the 2000 report was very critical of government pollution pre-
vention policies (Plaut  2000 ). In 1997, the Arlosoroff Commission recommended to 
reduce agricultural water uses and change the institutional structures dominated by 
the agricultural sector (Feitelson 2001, cited in Lipchin  2007 ). However, it took 
nearly another decade and a couple of years of severe drought brought on by the 
political lock-in until the propositions favouring agriculture were taken down. This 
policy shift was underpinned by breaking up Mekorot’s monopoly as Israel’s only 
water supplier (Feitelson  2013 ). 
 Since 2007, Israel has gradually implemented several measures to overcome the 
water crisis. The main measures were:
 1.  Reform of the water management institutions 
 2.  Enlargement of the water supply by different technical solutions (construction of 
sea water desalination plants on the Mediterranean coast, upgrading existing and 
construction of new wastewater recycling plants, use of the efﬂ uents for 
irrigation) 
 3.  Introduction of economic incentives (water prices) to manage demand 
 4.  A campaign to raise public awareness. 
16.3  Reform of the Water Management Institutions 
 In 2007, the Israel Water Authority was created to replace the former Water 
Commission. The “Governmental Authority for Water and Sewage” (Israel Water 
Authority) gradually gathered all regulatory bodies concerning water issues under 
its authority. The main objective of the 2007 reform was to
 […] enable the Authority implementing an integrative management of the whole ‘water chain’ 
and to transfer authorities from the political level of several ministers to one professional 
board. (Israel Water Authority  2012a , p. 1) 
 This has come into reality and today the Israel Water Authority is in charge of the 
management and regulation of the national water sector according to the water law. 
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The responsibilities of the Israel Water Authority include the preservation and regu-
lation of the water resources. This includes the production (from seawater), the 
supply and use of water, the design and implementation of water supply schemes 
and the allocation and price setting for all water sectors (private households, agri-
cultural and industrial) (OECD  2011 ). The Israel Water Authority intervenes in the 
sphere of withdrawal from the natural sources. Withdrawal without a permit is not 
possible. The Israel Water Authority issues permits at the beginning of each year 
according to hydrological considerations. Therefore, these permits differ from year 
to year (Kislev  2011 ). The users are required to present their requirements for the 
next year to the Israel Water Authority. 
 The Israel Water Authority Council has the primary responsibility for taking the 
water- related decisions. The council consists of eight elected members: the head of 
the Israel Water Authority as chairperson of the Israel Water Authority Council; one 
representative each from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection, the Ministry of Interior and Management of 
Local Authorities, the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Infrastructure; and 
two delegates of the public. The public representatives are appointed by the Minister 
of National Infrastructure. Kislev ( 2011 , p. 136) criticised that the public represen-
tatives “cannot be taken as a realisation of public involvement”. 
 With the creation of the Israel Water Authority, operations for managing waste 
and wastewater services were gradually transferred to water and sewerage corpora-
tions according to the Water and Sewage Association Law of 2001. This transfer of 
responsibility from the municipalities to the corporations was supposed to boost the 
construction of wastewater treatment plants. Before the reform, the ﬁ nancial 
resources required for the construction of wastewater treatment plants were not 
made sufﬁ ciently available to the municipalities (Hophmayer-Tokich  2010 ). As part 
of the reform, all revenues from water tariffs have now to be reinvested in water 
infrastructure (OECD  2011 ). The Israel Water Authority lists 55 corporations, 
which provide services for 6.2 million citizens in 147 local authorities (out of 187 
local authorities bound by law). The law does not apply to the West Bank, regional 
councils and water associations. The largest corporation serves 415,000 residents in 
Tel Aviv; the smallest serves only 14,000 residents. The Israeli public criticises the 
number of the corporations as too many, and plans for merging corporations exist. 
 The government cut ﬁ nancial assistance and imposed restrictions on the use of 
water revenues for those municipalities that did not form corporations, while it pro-
vided ﬁ nancial assistance to those municipalities which formed corporations (Kan 
and Kislev  2011 ). 
 The partial privatisation of Mekorot and the shift to call for bids, as one of the 
results of the governmental market liberalisation efforts, opened up a new ﬁ nancing 
mechanism in Israel (public–private partnership, PPP) and started the era of large 
desalination projects. 
 One of the major achievements of the political reforms in the water sector was 
the introduction of the full cost recovery principle. In 2002 the agricultural ministry 
accepted that subsidies for the agricultural sector were shifted from water to land 
subsidies, which allowed raising prices for agricultural water uses (Menahem and 
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Gilad  2013 ). In 2006 the government signed an agreement with farmers’ representa-
tives according to which prices for agriculture would be set according to the costs 
of Mekorot for supplying water to agriculture (Kislev  2013 ). By 2015 the full cost 
recovery principle should be applied to agriculture. 
 As a result of the institutional reforms, Israel increased investment in water infra-
structures, but compared to the energy sector, these increases have been far less 
signiﬁ cant (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics  2014 ). 
16.4  Desalination 
 The 1997 master plan already foresaw the implementation of large-scale seawater 
desalination plants (Tenne et al  2013 ), but it took until 2000 – following a severe 
drought – for the Minister of Finance to reverse his position of not ﬁ nancing large- 
scale desalination plants and to issue a tender (Feitelson  2013 ). According to 
Feitelson, the issue of such a tender has been the turning point in decreasing the 
costs of desalination plants. But according to Becker ( 2010 ), desalination was still 
not the lowest cost alternative to close the water gap. Therefore cost reduction was 
one of the major concerns in the realisation of Israel’s national planning programme 
for desalination. Besides the large-scale seawater desalination capacities, which 
today achieve an overall capacity of 577 × 10 6 m 3 /year, desalination capacities for 
brackish water exist for an additional 60 × 10 6 m 3 /year. This brackish water comes 
from groundwater wells (Tenne  2010 ). 
 In Israel desalination plants have to follow all public tender and bid procedures. 
With the exception of Ashkelon, which is operated by Mekorot, all seawater desali-
nation plants are ﬁ nanced, constructed and operated by private companies ( ibid. ). 
But in fact, only two companies (Mekorot and IDE) exist on the Israeli market 
increasing the risk of possible monopolistic market structures. The desalination 
facilities in Israel are ﬁ nanced via a build–operate–transfer (BOT) contract. The 
concessionaires design, build and operate the plants over a period of 26.5 years after 
which the plant is transferred to state ownership (Spiritos and Lipchin  2013 , 
p. 2014). During the time of operation, the companies receive the water revenues as 
private gains. 
 To reduce costs for the private investors of desalination plants, they are allowed 
to build power plants together with the desalination facilities, where the energy is 
not only used for the plants’ own energy provision but sold into the national energy 
grid at their own proﬁ t (Tenne  2010 ). 
 Along the Mediterranean coast, Israel has constructed ﬁ ve seawater desalination 
plants (see Fig.  16.1 ). The Sorek plant is the newest and largest, with a desalination 
capacity of 150 × 10 6 m 3 /year. The long-term master plan foresees a seawater desali-
nation capacity of up to 750 × 10 6 m 3 /year until 2020.
 It was necessary to reshape the national water grid to integrate the new desalina-
tion plants in the water distribution system. The National Water Carrier transports 
water from north to south, but with the construction of the desalination plants, water 
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had to be brought from the Mediterranean shoreline to the municipal centres. New 
lines from west to east were connected to the national water grid. With the extension 
of the drinking water network, the irrigation water network (recycled wastewater) 
had to be extended too (see Fig.  16.2 ).
 The costs for desalinated water are highly dependent on energy costs, which 
make up more than 50 % of total costs. Consequently, energy saving is promoted in 
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 Fig. 16.1  Desalination development from 2010 to 2014 (10 6 m 3 /year) (Data source: Israel Water 
Authority ( 2014a )) 
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 Fig. 16.2  Israel national water system (Source: Israel Water Authority) 
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2010, natural gas power generation is favoured for the desalination plants, while the 
national power system is still based on coal. 
 The prices for desalinated water are composed of a ﬁ xed price component for 
capital costs and a variable price component for variable costs, mainly for electricity 
prices (Lokiec  2011 ). The variable price is paid according to the quantity of water 
actually delivered, while the ﬁ xed price is paid according to the facilities’ capacity. 
The prices of desalinated water from Israel’s seawater desalination facilities are 
among the lowest worldwide. The national average is at USD 0.65; Sorek desalina-
tion plant is at USD 0.52 (Tenne  2010 ). 
 Cohen ( 2011 ) carried out a survey on the environmental impact of seawater 
desalination in Israel. He concluded that the Ashkelon, Palmachim and Hadera 
plants have no signiﬁ cant impact on the ecosystems of the receiving environments. 
One of the limiting factors for the construction of new seawater desalination plants 
in Israel is the limited space on Israel’s shorelines. Therefore, planned construction 
of future seawater desalination plants will be offshore (Tenne 2014, personal 
communication). 
 The water from the desalination plants has improved the water supply quality 
both for private households and agricultural uses. Hardness and salinity were 
reduced. This has had positive effects on lifetime of heaters and other household 
devices, and the productivity of agriculture was increased due to lowered salinity 
levels in the water supplied to agriculture (Tenne et al.  2013 ). 
 The water from the desalination plants is introduced into the National Water 
Carrier (see Fig.  16.3 ). The desalination plants must operate continuously in order 
to get the ﬁ xed cost component ﬁ nanced through water sales (Dreizin et al.  2008 ). 
Changes in water demand are therefore adjusted by inputs from the various “natu-
ral” water supply sources (e.g. groundwater). As a result of the water privatisation 
policy, the management of the supply is more oriented towards the goal of reducing 
costs. This means that domestic users may be provided with water from other 
sources than desalinated water and that agriculture may also use water from desali-
nation instead of using treated wastewater. This led to conﬂ icts between the policy 
of the Israel Water Authority with its objective of saving water and taking water 
from wastewater reuse and the actual supply management of the desalination plants 
and Mekorot (Tenne et al.  2013 ) that is oriented towards using the full amount of 
desalinated water available.
16.5  Extension of Wastewater Treatment Plants 
 In 2011 96 % of the Israeli population was connected to an urban wastewater treat-
ment system (Fig.  16.4 ). Most of the wastewater treatment plants are characterised 
by either secondary or tertiary treatment level. The water from tertiary treatment is 
unrestricted for irrigation uses. With the enlargement of the treatment capacities, 
new stringent quality parameters were introduced.
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 Fig. 16.3  National Water Carrier of Israel (Photo: Mekorot) 
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Percentage of Population Connected to Urban Waste Water Treatment System,
by Type of Treatment 2000–2011 
Primary treatment Secondary treatment Tertiary treatment No treatment Independent treatment Other treatment
 Fig. 16.4  Population connected to an urban wastewater treatment system, by type of treatment 
and level of treatment (Source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics ( 2013a , p. 38)) 
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 From 2002 to 2013, Israel invested nearly 2.8 billion New Israel shekel (NIS) 
(approx. USD 734 million) in wastewater infrastructure and wastewater reclamation 
plants. Another 1.5 billion NIS (USD 393 million) will be invested in the near 
future. Not only were 100 water treatment plants built or upgraded, but a separate 
wastewater pipeline network, including a 90 km pipeline to the Negev, had to be 
built for the country (Israel Water Authority  2014a ). In 2012, agriculture used 
429 × 10 6 m 3 of recycled wastewater ( ibid. ). For 2014, it was required that 50 % of 
the agricultural water uses should come from recycled wastewater; according to the 
National Water Plan, this share is supposed to rise to more than 90 % by 2050 (Israel 
Water Authority  2012b ). The rest will ﬂ ow back to nature. 
 Stringent efﬂ uent quality standards came into effect in 2010. The regulations set 
maximum levels for dissolved and suspended elements and compounds and for 36 
other parameters regarding efﬂ uents (European Environment Agency  2014 ). They 
came into effect to minimise the risk of soil and groundwater contamination by the 
use of wastewater for irrigation. 
 Apparently there is a conﬂ ict of interest between agriculture and environmental 
protection about the use of treated wastewater efﬂ uents. In the summer of 2014, the 
Israel Water Authority did not permit the use of treated wastewater for the rehabilita-
tion of the Kishon River in the Haifa area. The Ministry of Environmental Protection 
had to suspend further river rehabilitation plans because of the decision of the Israel 
Water Authority (Israel Ministry of Environmental Protection  2014 ). This example 
might also illustrate a lack of coherence between the river rehabilitation plans and 
the national water management plans issued by the Israel Water Authority. 
 Environmentalists have criticised the partial dumping of the remaining sludge 
into the Mediterranean. The sludge from the Shafdan sewage plant contributes at 
least 75 % and up to 98 % of the total load to the Israeli marine environment. It is 
planned that this source will be terminated by the end of 2015 (European Environment 
Agency  2014 ). 
16.6  Economic Instruments and Incentives 
 As a consequence of the restructuring of the water management institutions, the 
Israel Water Authority was able to considerably increase the prices for domestic 
water uses. The Israel Water Authority signed an agreement with the agricultural 
representatives that in 2015 the full cost recovery for agricultural water uses should 
be introduced. So far low water prices for the agricultural sector were cross- 
subsidised by higher water prices for domestic uses. 
 The water prices in Israel are set as a part of the general water law. The Israel Water 
Authority is responsible for establishing the water prices, and it does so according to 
the rules set by the Ministry of Finance, the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁ ce and the Ministry 
of National Infrastructures, Energy and Water Resources (Water.org.il  2014 ). 
 The current model for establishing the water prices is based on three main prin-
ciples (Israel Water Authority  2014a ):
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 1.  Equal treatment: The price of water from all water corporations should be equal 
for all end consumers (except for industrial consumers – they have different 
prices due to different sewage components). 
 2.  Block tariffs: Water prices for domestic uses are staggered in block tariffs. The 
ﬁ rst block goes up to 3.5 m 3 per capita and month. The approved quantity for a 
single member household is ﬁ xed to 7 m 3 . According to Kislev ( 2011 ), only in 
few cases for small households with high consumption is a higher block rate 
likely to be applied. Table  16.1 shows the share of consumers paying different 
tariffs. The ﬁ gures for 2010 to 2012 clearly indicate that water-saving measures 
for domestic consumption had been effective – the amount of households charged 
with a high block rate decreased considerably from 42.9 to 27.7 %. One reason 
is that private household can receive state support for the installation of water- 
saving devices. The reduction of freshwater consumption for domestic purposes 
was accompanied by the increase of treated wastewater uses for gardening, as 
quotas of water for watering private gardens had been cancelled (Kan and Kislev 
 2011 ). Also municipalities increasingly use recycled wastewater for the irriga-
tion of public gardens and parks ( ibid. ).
 3.  Full cost recovery: The prices of water are set according to the costs of providing 
water for the municipalities, including coverage of all expenses (operating and 
maintenance costs, interest for capital costs for ﬁ nancing water-related infra-
structures, calculatory costs). 
 The tariffs for domestic consumption are cost recovery rates. 1 These rates have 
two components (Fig.  16.6 ):
1  It should be mentioned here that the cost recovery principle in Israel is based on a “company 
perspective”. This means that the costs mirror all the necessary resources to safeguard the exis-
tence of a company – the company assets (operation and maintenance costs, capital costs for for-
eign capital, calculatory costs for company’s own capital). This company-oriented concept of cost 
calculation goes beyond the “reﬁ nancing” perspective of cost recovery, which refers to the reﬁ -
nancing of company’s expenditures (this does not include, e.g. calculatory costs). However, it does 
not include so-called social costs that mainly refer to the costs of environmental degradation; see 
Hansjürgens ( 1997 ). In Israel, this concept has led to increasing investments in water-related infra-
structures, as the companies can receive money from the capital market. 
 Table 16.1  Water consumption distribution 
 Low block 
rate (%) 
 High block 
rate (%)  Price a (%)  Price b (%)  Price c (%) 
 Gardening 
price (%) 
 2007  –  –  46.4  16.0  19.1  18.4 
 2008  –  –  48.8  17.2  18.6  15.4 
 2009  –  –  56.8  18.5  19.1  5.6 
 2010  57.1  42.9  –  –  –  – 
 2011  65.2  34.8  –  –  –  – 
 2012  71.7  27.7  –  –  –  – 
 Data source : Israel Water Authority ( 2014b ) 
 Note : Between 2009 and 2010, there was a change in the water tariffs 
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 (a)  “Costs for purchasing water from Mekorot at the municipality gate and costs for 
seawater desalination, wastewater treatment and subsidies”. 
 (b)  Costs for water distribution, sewage collection and wastewater treatment within 
the municipalities. 
 For a closer look on the tariff structure, we refer to Kislev ( 2011 ). 
 Water supply for agriculture is organised by an administrative allotment of quo-
tas. Trading of the quotas among the agricultural companies is permitted under 
restricted conditions. 
 Figure  16.5 shows the evolution of the average water prices (NIS) for the agricul-
tural, industrial and domestic sector from 2007 to 2014. Water prices for the domes-
tic sector increased from 2007 to 2014 by 151 %, while in 2014, for the ﬁ rst time, 
the prices had been lowered by approx. 3 %. Prices for the agricultural sector 
increased between 2007 and 2014 by approx. 52 % and for the industrial sector 
approx. 254 %. Compared with other sectors, such as the energy sector, price rises 
had been less signiﬁ cant. The prices for energy augmented from 2011 to 2013 up to 
31 %, compared with 6.3 % for price increases in the water sectors for the same 
period (Israel Water Authority  2014a ). The share of household expenditures on water 
services and related services compared with total consumption expenditures is 

























Average Water Prices per Sector (NIS/m3)
Agriculture Industry Domestic
 Fig. 16.5  Average water prices for agricultural, industrial and domestic water uses from 2007 to 
2014 (NIS/m 3 ). One New Israeli shekel (NIS) is equivalent to USD 0.26 (value as of November 2014) 
(Data source: (Israel Water Authority  2014b ,  c ), Israel Central Bureau of Statistics ( 2012 )) 
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For comparison, the consumer price index for the period between 2007 and 2014 is 
20.9 % (2006 = 100) according to the data provided by the Israel Central Bureau of 
Statistics (CBS).
 Certain population groups such as disabled people, victims of hostilities and 
people who are qualiﬁ ed to receive social welfare transfers receive governmental 
support. This support allows these groups of people to double their amount of water 
used; however, they still have to pay the price for the low block tariff – instead of 
3.5 m 3 per capita and month, these individuals can use 7 m 3 per capita a month for 
the low block tariff rate. The Knesset Finance Committee decides which population 
groups are eligible to receive this beneﬁ t, while the eligibility is decided by the 
Social Security (Bituach Leumi). The support itself comes from the local water 
corporation retroactively and is shown on the water invoice. 
 Figure  16.6 shows the components of the average uniform price. The corporation 
costs component (45 %) makes up the highest share, followed by the costs for Mekorot, 
which represents the costs of provisioning drinking water. The sewage treatment com-
ponent is about 16 %, and the component for desalinated water is about 13 %. 4 % goes 
to subsidies. From 2007 to 2014, the costs for water provision were nearly constant.
 The decisive point here is that water prices ease the ﬁ nancing of MWEPs and, 



















Water and sewage 
capital component 
(1.23 NIS) 



















 Fig. 16.6  Main components in the average uniform price of water for 2014 (NIS/m 3 ) (Data source: 
(Israel Water Authority  2014b ,  c )) 
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water-pricing schemes have been implemented, there is a strong push, not only for 
reinvestments but also for extensions and “modernisations” of such infrastructures. 
 The price structure for water for agriculture differs according to the quality of the 
water used (Fig.  16.7 ). It is separated into drinking water quality, water coming 
from wastewater treatment plants, efﬂ uents and brackish water. The price for drink-
ing water is set according to the costs of production, but does not include the sewage 
treatment component, subsidies and costs for the purchase of desalinated water. 
Therefore there is a cross-subsidy from the domestic to the agricultural water sector. 
Compared with the price increases for the industrial and the domestic sector, the 
price increases for the agricultural sector were quite moderate. Within the agricul-
tural sector, the share of energy prices caused the highest increases for agricultural 
inputs; water price increases played a much less important role (Fig.  16.8 ).
 Besides water pricing instruments, which are related to end users, water levies 
for extraction are ﬁ xed in order to charge the value of water at the source. Those 
levies apply mainly to those who do not purchase their water from Mekorot but 
extract it by themselves. The levies are directly paid to the State Treasury. Changes 
in levies are suggested by the Israel Water Authority and subject to approval by the 
Knesset Finance Committee (Kislev  2011 ). The levy is set as a purely ﬁ scal burden 
as it does not consider the characteristics of the services supplied by the ecosystem 
(Kedmi  2005 ). However, the calculation for the levies differs between different 
purposes: water for agriculture and water for domestic and industrial uses. The 























Prices Agricultural Water Uses for Different 
Qualitites (NIS/m3)
effluents waste water brackish drinking water
 Fig. 16.7  Prices for agricultural water uses according to different qualities (NIS/m 3 ). Prices were 
approximated (Data source: (Israel Water Authority  2014b ,  c ), Israel Central Bureau of Statistics 
( 2012 )) 
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levy level has increased steadily over the previous years, although not necessarily 
in accordance with the Israeli multi-annual plan (Kedmi  2005 ). The rates of the lev-
ies are determined on the basis of a number of parameters relating to the rate of 
water abstraction, the water production source, type and quality of water, hydro-
logical situation, the purpose of the production and the quantity and type of the 
water produced (Israel Water Authority). 
 The levy system is divided into three regions: the country system area (in fact, 
those areas connected to the National Water Carrier), areas disconnected from the 
country system, and the Lake Tiberias area ( ibid. ). 
 Currently the levies for agricultural drilling within the country system are set at 
50 % of the regular rates. In addition, agriculture is exempted from VAT ( ibid. ). 
Here we notice again that the agricultural level is beneﬁ tting from different 
(implicit) subsidies. 
 There is also an ongoing discussion in Israel whether the potassium companies 
at the Dead Sea should continue to be exempted from the extraction levy. With 
300 × 10 6 m 3 water extraction per year, the companies signiﬁ cantly contribute to the 
decline of the Dead Sea (TAHAL and GSI  2011 ). The authors of the Study of 
Alternatives (Allan et al.  2014 , p. 74) proposed a levy of USD 0.1/m 3 , under the 
condition that the income generated from the planed hydropower production 
(exploiting the elevation difference between the Red Sea and the Dead Sea) is 
included into the calculations. 
 But the technical feasibility of hydropower production based on saline water or 
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 Fig. 16.8  Price index of input in agriculture from 2007 to 2013 (base year 2000 = 100) (Data 
source: Israel Central Bureau of Statistics  2013b ) 
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of the terms of reference for the different studies. There are sound reservations con-
cerning realisation costs and lifetime of such a project: the generation of energy via 
salt water, or even brine will be achievable only with considerable technical effort 
in the use of corrosion-resistant materials. Maintenance and lifetime expectations 
will be not comparable to normal hydropower plants. It is estimated that the costs of 
the pipeline according to the plans of the water swap will be approx. USD 300 to 
USD 400 million (Udasin  2013 ). The construction of the pipeline will take 3–4 
years and will cross the Jordanian part of the Arava Valley. The conveyance of the 
brine from the Red Sea to the Dead Sea would therefore raise the price of water by 
at least USD 0.25/m 3 (on the basis of an amortisation period of the pipeline of 30 
years). With respect to the polluter pays principle, a levy for the potash companies 
should at least be equivalent to the additional costs for water for conveying brine to 
the Dead Sea to compensate for uses upstream and from the Dead Sea Works them-
selves. For comparison, the costs of water for the restoration of the Lower Jordan 
River are about USD 0.10/m 3 (Allan et al.  2012 , p. 30). 
16.7  Awareness-Raising Measures 
 In 2008 the Israel government and the Israel Water Authority started a comprehensive 
campaign to inform and raise awareness on reducing domestic water consumption. 
The installation of water-saving devices in private households and gardens and meter-
ing for the irrigation in private and public gardens were ﬁ nancially supported. 
 Another important measure to raise awareness is the online publication of water 
use data and of data on the groundwater levels in the different basins. The levels of 
Lake Tiberias are reported on a monthly basis and can be viewed on an online 
graph. Its level is an important communication instrument as droughts and water 
shortages can be visualised directly with the passing of the critical lake level red 
line. Also the level of the Dead Sea is published on a monthly basis, making extreme 
water stress in the region visible. 
 Furthermore, water prices are published on the Israel Water Authority website. 
All water data is publicly available and presented in a transparent manner. 
16.8  Discussion of Water Management Impacts 
 Israel is a striking example of how long it may take (nearly 20 years) to effectively 
accomplish a shift in water management practices – even though the development 
in water stress in the region requires an even faster pace of change. Israel is likewise 
an example that land and water management are deeply rooted in the nation’s val-
ues, which make it psychologically difﬁ cult to introduce changes, as one has to give 
up long-standing traditions and values. With regard to agriculture, Israel is far from 
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giving up its “agricultural Zionistic ideal” despite the negligible economic impor-
tance of the agricultural sector which counts for only 1.4 % of Israel’s GDP. 
 Figure  16.9 reveals that changes in total water uses are mainly determined by 
decreases in agricultural water uses. Even though population increased consider-
ably, domestic and industrial water uses remained nearly the same. However, this 
also means that per capita domestic water consumption decreased. The ﬁ gure also 
indicates that the cuts in the water allocation for the agricultural sector in the late 
1990s had a greater impact on the reduction of the overall water consumption by the 
agricultural sector than the agricultural pricing policies after the water reforms start-
ing in 2007.
 This also applies for the use of drinking water in the agricultural sector, as a 
detailed analysis of the agricultural water consumption reveals (Fig.  16.10 ). 
Drinking water was mainly replaced by the use of treated sewage water. But still, 
with more than 400 × 10 6 m 3 of drinking water consumed in 2012, the agricultural 
sector uses a substantial amount of freshwater for irrigation purposes. This use goes 
along with prices, which only reﬂ ect the costs of the provision of water. However, 
the costs of seawater desalination and other investments costs, especially costs of 
the wastewater treatment infrastructures and the extension of the national water grid 
system, are still not included. If the cost recovery principle had been comprehen-
sively applied to the agricultural sector, the sector would have been forced to pay 
water prices equivalent to those for private households. Thus the present pricing 
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 Fig. 16.9  Development of water uses for different sectors from 1996 to 2012 (10 6 m 3 ) (Data 
source: Israel Water Authority ( 2011 ), Israel Water Authority ( 2014 )) 
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 In some respect, Israel’s water policy faces a dilemma: with the reduction of the 
household consumption of drinking water and the increased use of wastewater for 
public gardening (which also leads to a substitution of drinking water), there is less 
wastewater available, forcing the agricultural sector to use drinking water as a sub-
stitute to upholding its production. Practices in Israel’s irrigation are of the highest 
state of knowledge, and their advanced techniques serve as a role model for the 
world. Although Israel is still undertaking major efforts in furthering increases in 
irrigation efﬁ ciency, its additional water-saving potential is limited due to the high 
standards already achieved. The only way to get out of this dilemma is either to 
reduce agriculture in some parts of the country or to convert the existing 
 water- intensive agricultural practices to dry land agriculture. Becker et al. ( 2013 ) 
have produced evidence that it can be economically beneﬁ cial to give up agriculture 
for the rehabilitation of the Lower Jordan River. 
 Other regions in Israel with a high potential for recreation activities and rehabili-
tation of their ecosystems might also beneﬁ t from this. Israel is a country with a 
high population density, especially in the greater Tel Aviv area. Parks and pristine 
landscapes are a necessity for urbanised areas not only for their effects on the 
microclimate but also for the health and the well-being of the population. These 
ecosystem services might be of equal importance to the economic beneﬁ ts obtained 
from agriculture. 
 Seawater desalination helped to sustain Lake Tiberias, but present allocations to 
the environment (80 × 10 6 m 3 /year) are not sufﬁ cient to successfully rehabilitate the 
Jordan River and the Dead Sea. If in the future all treated wastewater will be used 
for agriculture, conﬂ icts will increase between agricultural use and the water needs 
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 Fig. 16.10  Agricultural water uses divided into origin of source from 1996 to 2012 (10 6 m 3 ) (Data 
source: Israel Water Authority ( 2011 ), Israel Water Authority ( 2014a )) 
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tation of rivers is far from being given priority within the Israel Water Authority. 
Israel’s water management is highly centralised and linked to its scientiﬁ c techno-
cratic embedment. At present water planning mostly originates from this back-
ground, one of the reasons why water strategies have been criticised openly by the 
public and in politics. The civil society with its nature protection organisations and 
consumer protection groups is currently not represented in the water commission. A 
better representation of these groups might not make the decision-making process 
easier or shorter but in the end might lead to a better understanding and higher con-
sensus within the Israeli society. 
 Pricing policies and levies to address the scarcity of natural resources as an 
incentive for water-saving measures are especially subject to differing interests and 
the volatile nature of political processes. 
 Many municipalities refuse to participate in the overall water allocations system. 
They expect a loss of independence and reduced potential for cross-subsidising 
other sectors (Kan and Kislev  2011 ). Improving civil society involvement and par-
ticipation in water management planning processes could also help to reprioritise 
the objectives of water allocation and water pricing and increase support for unpop-
ular measures within society. 
 Israel suffers not only from water shortages but also from increased income dis-
parities and low welfare expenditures (Dahan and Hazan  2014 ). The outbreak of the 
social protests in summer 2011 is a reﬂ ection of these disparities. But water pricing 
would be the wrong instrument to mitigate these disparities. Low-income groups 
are supported by speciﬁ c welfare programmes instead of lower water prices. 
 The restructuring process within Israel’s water management has still not come to 
an end with regard to water corporations. Two speciﬁ c problems are linked to this 
issue: the ﬁ rst is that there are far too many water companies in Israel, and the sec-
ond is that under the uniform tariff structure system, companies who perform well 
have to support the ones who perform less well (Kan and Kislev  2011 ). This is due 
to water corporations with high water losses and high losses in water charges 
(because of compliance problems in water price payments) paying lower prices to 
Mekorot. To reemphasise – according to the equity principle, despite end-users’ 
respective water resource use, all water prices are identical – subsequently this 
results in different costs in different regions. The government and Israel Water 
Authority need to ﬁ nd a way out of this dilemma ( ibid. ). 
16.9  Can Israel Serve as a Role Model? 10 Lessons 
to Be Learnt 
 Israel has a very speciﬁ c water management and the speciﬁ city of the availability of 
its water resources, technical facilities and governance structures limits the transfer-
ability of the Israeli experiences to other countries. Nevertheless, some lessons can 
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be drawn from the Israeli case example. The ﬁ rst seven lessons are general in nature, 
while the last three refer to water pricing:
  1.  Innovative solutions to improve water supply and high technical standards are 
an important prerequisite to reduce water stress and improve the water situa-
tion. In Israel, major innovative technical solutions include new and innovative 
types of irrigation systems in the agricultural sector, highly innovative desalina-
tion systems, advanced wastewater treatment facilities for the reuse of water 
and the building of the corresponding infrastructure systems (e.g. water grid 
systems). 
  2.  An important prerequisite for building up water-related infrastructures are suf-
ﬁ cient ﬁ nancial resources. In Israel these resources have been made available 
since the foundation of the State of Israel. One important reason is that the 
agricultural sector received highest priority within the political discussions. 
Even though the signiﬁ cance of agriculture decreased in budgetary terms (in 
terms of the share of agriculture in the Israeli GDP), the agricultural sector is 
still seen as very important, and therefore, considerable public expenditure is 
devoted to this sector. A second reason for successfully ﬁ nancing the water sec-
tor lies in the raising of revenues from the users of water resources. 
  3.  Nevertheless, it is not sufﬁ cient to just focus on water supply and the develop-
ment and improvement of water infrastructure systems (and on the ﬁ nancing of 
these infrastructures). The improvement of existing and development of new 
water supply systems is a necessity, but not sufﬁ cient enough to improve the 
overall water situation. Technical supply measures have to be accompanied by 
management structures that complement technical developments, such as 
appropriate forms of governance and institutional reform. In Israel this has been 
achieved through comprehensive organisational reforms (the centralisation of 
powers) and the introduction of water prices intended to incentivise users to use 
water resources more effectively. 
  4.  Strong institutions and the rule of law are preconditions for the successful 
implementation of water policy reforms, which are often neglected when policy 
makers and decision makers simply focus on technical solutions alone. If 
 adequate institutional structures do not exist, policy reforms will fail. Even if 
technical solutions deliver success in the short run, links with institutional 
structures are decisive for long-term sustainability. Institution building and 
strengthening (with respect to water authorities, division of responsibilities 
between actors, regulation, etc.) are therefore necessary preconditions before 
any other reforms (such as pricing) can be introduced. Weak state institutions 
impact on other reforms in water policies. 
  5.  Time is needed to successfully develop infrastructure systems, not only for tech-
nical reasons (long construction periods for large infrastructures) but mainly 
because they have to go hand in hand with institutional reform. As economic and 
societal rules are deeply embedded in society’s legal system and culture, eco-
nomic and societal changes have to be made gradually and with care. Even within 
highly centralised organised water management institutions as in Israel, the 
reshaping of the institutions (founding water authorities, deﬁ ning and allocating 
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competences, deﬁ ning regulatory rules, etc.) and the introduction of new steering 
mechanisms (such as full cost recovery principle or water quotas for the agricul-
tural sector) take many years or even decades. Therefore, there is the danger of 
seeing one of these elements (e.g. the cost recovery principle) as the “magic pill” 
that will solve all “ills” in water management alone. 
  6.  Israel is an outstanding example of science, practice and government interact-
ing closely together. Scientists play an important role in the water sector and in 
agricultural organisations. Especially in agriculture, this is one of the major 
reasons why technological pace has been so rapid. To increase efﬁ ciency, in 
particular for irrigation, this close system of interactions and relations between 
science and practice can truly serve as role models in other countries. 
  7.  Israel is the only country in the region where water management and water 
policy are presented transparently. Anyone who would like information on 
water uses and water prices can obtain it. The credibility of water policies is 
enhanced by such an open and transparent information policy, even though 
there might be space for improvement, especially with respect to the participa-
tion of the civil society in the formulation of the water policy. 
  8.  Water prices and levies play an important role in Israeli water policy. If prop-
erly designed, they can set incentives for water savings and an efﬁ cient use of 
water. A water price reform can therefore be an important supplement for water 
management strategies. However, in order to be successful in incentivising end- 
users’ behaviour, water prices and levies should address the full cost of water 
(cost recovery principle) and the fair distribution of water prices among users. 
  9.  With respect to cost recovery and allocative efﬁ ciency, it is important that all 
costs are included in the water price and that all sectors that use water are in fact 
obliged to contribute to the water pricing scheme. Cost recovery should not only 
be applied to a share of the user groups. However, in many countries, this will 
cause problems: the agricultural sector is seen as fundamental for the welfare of 
countries, leading to a deep-rooted need in societies to protect their agricultural 
sector and an automatic rejection of burdens such as water prices or levies. 
 10.  Social equity may also be seen as a major obstacle to introducing the cost- 
recovery principle on the level of domestic end users. Even in economically 
prosperous states such as Israel, water price policies are not disconnected from 
the overall social debate. The greater the income disparities, the more difﬁ cult 
will be the introduction of the cost recovery principle. Uniform tariff structures 
might be fair to the consumers but impede the efﬁ ciency of the local water utili-
ties. This might only be a question for states with highly centralised water man-
agement institutions such as in Israel, but in many other regions under water 
stress, such centralised institutions are in place. Speciﬁ c solutions have to be 
found to increase efﬁ ciency of the water utilities under such conditions. 
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